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Introduction
In recent years, monetary policy practice has been increasingly relying on a model based assessment of actual and future policy stance. Along with the increasing requirements posed on models in terms of level of sophistication and complexity, in order to provide the policy maker with more information about the consequences of its intended actions, one can observe a tendency of moving away from producing conditional in favor of unconditional macroeconomic forecasts. Taking the example of central banks that target inflation, among 22 banks in 2005 (Batini et al., 2005) , eight 1 produce unconditional forecasts, while many of these launched this regime with conditional forecasts.
In effect, it enlarged the traditional pool of researchers to whom the accurate policy rule estimation is of obvious interest, i.e., the market participants trying to anticipate future policy rate changes, by one more group that now seeks accurate estimations of the policy rule to calibrate policy analysis models -the central bank's own research staff. The general concern is how to estimate and calibrate an operational policy rule and how to use it in practical policy implementation; in particular, how the identification depends on data frequency, policy rule specification, and method of estimation.
A policy rule estimated in limited specification (as it is usual for operationalized rules) through ordinary least squares might be misspecified and thus parameter estimates biased.
The use of simple policy rules of the Taylor type, which predominantly involves inflation, inflation target, output gap, and neutral policy rate, is widespread in policy analysis frameworks. However, in reality, a broader set of variables (some even not directly measurable) determines the policy rate setting.
The misspecification and bias of policy rule parameter estimates, which might result in overstatement of policy inertia, is however likely to be lower with lower data frequency.
Although the decision about the key policy rate is carried out on a monthly basis, many operational models are quarterly and therefore we pay attention to the conceptual difference between quarterly and monthly data analysis to extract unbiased parameters of policy rules. Namely, we suppose that there might be a larger set of variables that determine the policy rate setting with monthly frequency than with quarterly frequency, since some of the determinants of monthly frequency are temporary and might get eliminated by quarterly averaging. Nevertheless, many variables enter the policy rule in gaps, thus averaging into quarters might eliminate some (but generally not all) of the additional temporary determinants, which are hard to quantify, but at the same time it could cause a loss of information in measurable objectives (for instance in inflation gap). Therefore, we compare estimates on both frequencies, test for some regularities, and discuss how the use of biased parameters might bear important consequences for policy implementation.
A great portion of the empirical literature has been devoted to studying the policy rule of the Federal Reserve System. For the purpose of the studied phenomenon, we distinguish studies according to the data frequency they analyze, i.e., monthly vs. quarterly.
For seminal papers using monthly data we go back to Rosett (1959) , who suggested to apply essentially an ordered probit to address the rigid nature of the discount rate. A sequence of papers applying alternative discrete dependent variable models followed, including Feinman(1993) and Hakkio and Pearce (1992) . Most recently, Choi (1999) derived a two-sided-type II tobit that accounts not only for the discrete nature of the discount rate but also for its partial censoring. It is rather apparent that the zero policy rate changes have the potential to be censored, which is Choi's conjecture; however, he also assumes that the non-zero policy rate changes are uncensored. The later assumption is, however, not entirely correct. The monetary authority adjusts its policy rate usually by a quarter of a percentage point since the council dislikes policy rate reversals, i.e., it aims at avoiding instability in financial markets (advocated by Goodfriend, 1991; Cukierman, 1989; and Rudebusch, 1995) and limits the number of large policy rate changes that could lead to a loss in credibility (see Goodhart, 1997) . Thus, the outcome of the monetary policy decision meeting would be most often a quarter of a percentage point increase (decrease) in the pol-icy rate even if the policy maker intended, based on fundamentals, to increase (decrease) by half a percentage point or more.
An example of such practice can be seen in a quotation from the minutes of the FED's FOMC meeting held on February 3-4, 1994: "In the course of the Committee's discussion, a number of members endorsed a policy move that would involve only a slight adjustment toward a less accommodative degree of reserve pressure. These members recognized that evolving economic conditions might well justify a somewhat greater policy adjustment. They believed, however, that even a slight move at this time was likely to have a particularly strong impact on financial markets because it would be the first policy change after a long hiatus and indeed the first tightening action in about five years."
This implies that the non-zero discount rate changes are also potentially censored due to the presence of non-fundamental determinants.
In order to account for possible censoring of all policy rate changes, i.e., zero as well as nonzero, we develop a two-stage estimation procedure that combines the ordered probit and the censored regression. 2 Since the ordered probit delivers unbiased parameter estimates, we use these for deriving a censoring indicator (including non-censored observations) that we subsequently use in the censored regression. This procedure delivers unbiased coefficients and improves statistical efficiency of estimates. The marginal effects are constant, i.e., directly comparable to the calibrated linear policy rules, and thus it is advantageous for initial calibration, verification, and update of linear policy rules used in policy practice.
Besides, it allows for treating the determinants of censoring as unknown. We provide a method verification on the Czech Republic, where unique data on implicit policy rate are 2 We focus on monthly frequency models, which involve a discrete dependent variable since we consider these more correct from the point of view of the frequency of the actual decision process. We use the policy rate since the assumption that the continuous money market rate sufficiently approximates the discrete policy rate is in our view problematic due to the fact that money market rates contain the interpretation of the communication of a central bank by the market and thus a policy rate misspecification of a different kind remains a problem (inclusion of a speech index would be necessary, see Musard-Gies, 2005). available. We further apply the method to the U.S. data set used by Choi (1999) and discuss the improvements in our new estimator.
In search for symptoms of quarterly policy rule misspecification, the recent literature is not consensual. On one side, the evidence of a low portion of predicted variance of future rates by the market is exposed as proof for non-inertial policy rules, see Rudebusch (2002) .
On the other side stands evidence on the size of shocks in policy rules that makes the future rates less predictable even with policy rate smoothing; see Soederlind et al. (2004) .
We bring additional evidence to this issue by comparing the projections of policy rate by a high-smoothing central bank and the financial market. In this way we prove, with an example of the Czech financial market, that policy rate inertia might be existing even if the market does not succeed in predicting the future rates.
Nevertheless, we consent that the empirically found policy rate inertia might be overstated in least squares estimation due to policy rule specification error. The misspecified policy rule causes bias in all coefficients, however prominently in the size of smoothing for two reasons. Firstly, the governing council fears policy reversals and therefore the additional variables (often omitted in estimation) are such that the council downsizes the implied size of a policy rate change, which results in higher policy rate smoothing. Secondly, the serial correlation in the omitted variables is naturally instrumented through the past dependent variable, thus omitted variables lead to overstatement of inertia (see Rudebusch, 2002) . Therefore, we focus on the evidence on estimates of inertia and carry out a meta-analysis of available estimates in the literature with the aim of establishing some regularities with respect to data frequency and method of estimation. We suppose that the instrumental variable methods will deliver systematically lower inertia than ordinary least squares due to their robustness to marginal misspecification and that monthly inertial bias will be higher than quarterly. We make use of results in the following studies: Amato and Laubach (1999), Our results confirm a statistically significant upward bias in monetary policy inertia by the least squares estimator applied to monthly as well as to quarterly data. The major policy implication is that least squares learning of a central bank might lead to increasing policy rate inertia over time due to systematic inertia overstatement in the update of a policy rule.
In section 2 I describe a model for the policy rate, and in section 3 I derive the estimation procedure for unbiased parameter estimates of policy rules. In section 4 I provide with the verification of the method and section 5 contains results of policy rule estimation on the U.S. data. Section 6 develops the analysis of policy inertia on quarterly frequency and section 7 concludes.
Policy rate model
The decision about setting the key policy rate is a result of a complex process. At every monetary decision meeting, the bank's governing council assesses the current and forecasted macroeconomic conditions (such as output gap, inflation, equilibrium interest rate which defines a basic set of measurable variables, here referred to as a core framework), and considering all other relevant information, it decides whether to adjust or keep the policy rates setting.
Since all (zero as well as non-zero) policy rate changes are potentially determined by more variables than are quantifiable in practice, the need for estimation of the policy rule using representation with a limited number of variables requires a special estimation treatment.
If all true motives for the policy rate changes would be quantifiable, the policy rule would be easily estimated applying least squares to the full specification. However, some of the objectives that are pursued by the governing council are not straightforward to quantify and thus variable omission causes biased parameter estimates. Since the omitted variable is relevant and often impossible to quantify and determinants of the policy rate changes are in fact pertaining to the governing council, it resembles the censoring process when the council occasionally censors the usual core framework. Thus, we use censoring as a vintage for the policy rate setting process.
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Let us define ∆i * t = i * t − i t−1 , which represents the change in policy rate that would correspond to the quantifiable variables. Hence, the changes in the observed policy rate settings ∆i t might be only partially coinciding with the unobserved ∆i * t due to an influence of some of the additional explanatory variables on ∆i t . Let the available set of explanatory variables X t be a subset of the full set of explanatory variables Ω t . Then it follows that
where Z t ≡ Ω t − X t .Thus omitting variables Z t biases the estimates of β 2 in the least squares regression if X 0 t (Z 0 t β 0 ) 6 = 0, which is often the case since shocks in explanatory variables are highly correlated; see arguments of Rudebusch (2002) . 3 If the matrix of regressors X t contains the past dependent variable (policy rate smoothing), the bias is likely translated into an overstatement of the parameter pertaining to this variable. This is motivated by two reasons, one fundamental and one technical. The fundamental reason is that the motives of the governing council, mainly fear from policy reversals, are such that the council downsizes the implied size of the policy rate change and thus the censoring results in higher policy rate smoothing. The mechanical reason is that the serial correlation in the omitted variables is naturally instrumented through the past dependent variable and thus the omission of the variables Z t potentially causes an increase in the smoothing term as well.
In practice, though, the aim is to estimate the following relation without bias, since the policy rate recommendation to the governing council should be based on quantifiable variables (core framework) and unbiased coefficients pertaining to them:
where β 2 represents the coefficients pertaining to the explanatory variables in X t ; u 2,t denotes i.i.d. random error N(0, σ 2 2 ). If there is an omitted variable problem (vector of omitted variables Z t ), i.e., misspecification of the policy rule, we still can model the partially observed policy rate using the following formalization of the observation-by-observation censored model:
The thresholds T u and T l are equal to ±12.5 basis points (b.p.) since the policy rate is predominantly adjusted by discrete changes of 25 b.p. If X t ≡ Ω t , then all ∆i t = ∆i * t and the estimation can proceed with a linear estimator since there are no censored observations.
Since we assign ∆i t = ∆i * t even if in fact ∆i t − T l < ∆i * t ≤ ∆i t + T u , the estimates will be unbiased, however inefficient since the variance u 2,t will be constant but nevertheless higher, compared to knowledge of the continuous dependent variable. If we have, however, only X t to our disposal, we need to remedy the misspecification bias. One can either try to account for all possible explanatory variables, or apply an alternative estimator that would be robust to the omitted, unobserved, and often hardly quantifiable variables (unknown censoring). In the next section we present such an alternative estimation method.
Estimation procedure
We design the following two-stage estimation procedure. The first stage can be described using an ordered probit, similarly to the frictions model by Rosett (1959) . Let ∆i t be an observed discrete ordered policy rate response taking values {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n }, where m j denotes a particular magnitude of observed change in policy rate. The change in implicit policy rate ∆i * X t and u 1,t stands for i.i.d. random error N(µ, σ 2 1 ). In practice, the following propositions are likely to hold, i.e, E(Z 0 t β 0 |X t ) = 0 and N c /N → 0, since censoring by the council is occasional (if it was a regular practice, there would be likely an adjustment to the core framework) and further since the fear from policy reversals makes the council censor both from the right and from the left equally probable in a sufficiently long sample.
We can express the relation between the latent (implicit policy rate) variable ∆i * t and the observed variable ∆i t as follows:
which means that at each of the m j thresholds, denoted as T m 1 < T m 2 < . . . < T m n , the magnitude of policy rate change m j in observed policy rate discretely switches to a different one in an ordered manner. Since the policy rate changes usually by multiples of 25 b.p., the thresholds should take a value of multiples of 12.5
The standard deviation of X 0 t β 1 is denoted as σ X 0 t β 1 and similarly σ ∆i * stands for the standard deviation of ∆i * t .
If the number of censored observations N c is small relative to the number of observations in the sample N c /N → 0, i.e., censoring is occasional, the identified thresholds T m i /σ X 0 t β 1 will be close to the expected fixed values of 12.5/σ ∆i * b.p. and its multiples. If N c /N is large, the ordered probit will still estimate unbiased parameters (ordered probit parameter estimates are robust to marginal misspecification; see White, 1982) . However, for the evaluation of the censoring indicator, one needs to use the precise values of multiples of 12.5
since the underlying idea is to compare what the council should have done (based on core framework), conditional on the quantifiable variables (given that it adjusts the rate by multiples of a quarter of a percentage point) with what it actually did.
The maximum likelihood for the ordered probit is:
In the case that the data contains multiple sizes of changes (n is large), the ordered probit will deliver consistent but inefficient parameter estimates. Besides, the inconstancy (nonlinearity) of the marginal effects of exogenous variables in ordered probit complicates their direct use for policy purposes. Therefore, we suggest using the consistently estimated parameters from ordered probit for evaluating the probabilities of censoring from the left, right, and of uncensored observations and performing a censored regression. The censoring respects the maximum likelihood of the alternative outcomes. Observations ∆i t = 0 are said to be censored as follows if 4
The evaluation of the particular probabilities (for the case of three distinct sizes of policy rate changes, i.e., 0, 0.25, and -0.25), follows:
The equations (6) state that while observing no change in the announced policy rate, the policy rule implied a change, i.e., the probability of keeping the policy rate steady is smaller than both the probability of increasing and decreasing it. At the same time, if the largest probability is P 1 (P 2 ) among P 1 ,P 2 , and P 3 , we identify censoring from the left (right).
Similarly, in the case of observed non-zero changes ∆i t 6 = 0, we have
The conditions in (7) are also very straightforward. We evaluate the probability conditional on the quantifiable variables in X t that the rates should be changed by more than the respective threshold, i.e., P 0 and P 4 . Let us consider for instance the following situation.
The probability that rates should be changed by more than the respective threshold exceeds the probability of keeping the rates steady, i.e. P 2 , and decreasing the rates, i.e. P 1 , and at the same time it exceeds also the probability of increasing by less than the threshold, i.e.
(P 3 − P 4 ). Then, the council censored the size of increase implied by the core framework, i.e., the council increased by less than would correspond to the recommendation based on the core framework.
In other words, the first stage identifies the observations, in which the operational policy rule does not meet the condition for no misspecification, ∆i t = ∆i * t , i.e., the occasions at which the governing council censored the core framework.
In the second stage we complement the censored regression model by using the indicator of censoring derived on the basis of the first stage estimation. Besides improving the efficiency of estimates, in the presence of uncensored observations, the parameters will be constant and compatible with those calibrated in the lineal policy rules. The second stage of the model can be represented as follows:
The estimation of the censored regression follows the standard maximum likelihood method.
11
The likelihood function for the observation-by-observation censored regression model can be written as follows:
The censoring indicator I t is constructed as follows:
where observations censored from the left, right, and uncensored are assigned −1, 1, and 0, respectively. For the evaluation of the particular probabilities (for the case of three distinct sizes of policy rate changes, i.e., 0, 0.25, and -0.25), see below equations (6) and (7).
Method verification: nearly laboratory data
The applicability of the proposed method is demonstrated using data for the policy rule of the Czech National Bank, which is one of the pioneers of explicit inflation targeting in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. The advantage of using the Czech example is mainly in the availability of unique data for the true (and real-time data) 6 determinants and calibrated coefficients of the policy rate i * t :
i * i.e., X 0 t β 2 , based on which the governing council has been advised to adjust policy rate i t :
The matrix Z t contains the potencially relevant variables that are considered by the governing council in rate decisions in addition to the variables in X t (core framework). These variables are, however, omitted in the estimation.
Specification and Data
Although inflation targeting was implemented at the beginning of 1998, the Czech National i * These operations and omission of Z 0 t β 0 transform the policy rule into the following form:
where
Besides the monthly two-week repo rate (policy rate), the data further comprises the quar- Descriptive statistics of the data used in the analysis are shown in Table 1 . The sample period is characterized by a negative output gap, inflation forecast under the target, and policy rates below their neutral level. As for the statistics on policy rate changes, the rate has been changed nine times out of 36 monthly meetings of the council. Three times the council decided to increase and six times to decrease the rate. All changes in the two-week repo rate were of the size of 25 b.p. At twenty seven meetings the rates remained on-hold.
Estimation results
We present four regressions. First, we estimated the equation (13) using the ordinary least squares, i.e., ignoring possible misspecification. Then we estimated the two-sided-tobit type II, allowing only zero policy rate changes to be potentially censored. 7 Next, we applied the two-stage procedure that consists of an ordered probit in the first stage, and then using Table 2 , along with the statistics pertaining to them.
7 Two-Step estimator for a two-sided tobit type II using Heckman's procedure. The first step is the Ordered Probit (-1,0,1). The likelihood function reads
where T m i denotes the tolerance ancillary parameters. The second step is the ordinary least squares with inverse Mill's ratio (λ t ):
where ε t denotes the model error and η H,t stands for the Heckman's approximation error,
. The vector of parameters b 1 is the estimate of β 1 . We applied White's (1980) approach to derive consistent standard errors using the second step residuals e i as (Z 0 .09 * * * (.02)
.09 * * * (.035)
.05 * (.03)
.09 * * * The model in the first stage identified the following thresholds: T m 1 = 6.23 * * * (2.8) and T m 2 = 11.48 * * * (4.1) , which correspond to 1.4 times the standard error of fitted values X 0 t β 1 , (σ X 0 t β 1 = 4.45). These thresholds seem very plausible, since for instance 1. , respectively, the rate should have been changed, according to the core framework, by more than it was observed. Such observations would be considered censored non-zero policy rate changes, otherwise uncensored. Similarly, in the periods when the council did not change the rates and the evaluated probability would suggest so, these periods would be labeled as censored policy rate changes at zero. All other situations would be considered as uncensored.
As it appears in the Table 2 , the smoothing term (i t−1 ) by OLS is excessive: the statistically significant difference between mean estimates by OLS and the censored regression (model's calibration) amounts to .04. Similarly, the remaining coefficients by OLS are accordingly lower (the difference for p e t -p tar t is .02−.03, and for ygap t it is .01). In addition, the parameter of the output gap (ygap t ) in OLS regression even appears statistically insignificant. These results imply that the policy rule is misspecified, namely that there are other relevant variables in the governing council's decision, i.e., Z 0 t β 0 6 = 0 and that X 0 t (Z 0 t β 0 ) 6 = 0.
In contrast to OLS estimates, the two stage procedure of ordered probit and observation- 
Data and estimation results
As we aim at presenting a new method for estimating of a policy rule more accurately, we follow the benchmark specifications of the discount rate as in Choi (1999) , since his model appears to be, to our knowledge the most advanced model to date. Hence the Benchmark I. specification (equivalent to the core framework) reads
and the extended Benchmark I. for some additional potential objectives, which we label as Benchmark II., can be written as
The lagged official discount rate as the last day rate is denoted as i t−1 and the lagged difference of the official discount rate as ∆i t−1 . The lagged percentage deviation of the industrial production index (87=100) from its trend is denoted as y t−1 , where the trend is derived as a geometric interpolation of benchmark rates (see Choi 1999) . Similarly, ∆y t is the first difference of the gap in industrial production.
Further, π t−1 is the lagged deviation of the y-o-y inflation from the target of 2% and ∆π t is its first difference. And finally, the m t stands for the y-o-y monetary aggregate M1 growth as a deviation from its Hodrick-Prescott trend and s t stands for the difference of the lagged official discount rate from the Federal funds rate target set prior to the discount rate announcement (for further details, see Choi 1999) . The residuals ε t are i.i.d. However, in both specifications, (14) and (15) , there might be a problem of misspecification, i.e., some other true determinants Z t of the policy rate i t might have been omitted, likely due to the fact that these are often inquantifiable in reality, such that Z 0 t β 0 6 = 0 and X 0 t (Z 0 t β 0 ) 6 = 0.
Benchmark regressions
We first present the replication of the results for benchmark regressions as they were obtained by Choi (1999) and then apply our method (ordered probit and censored regression) to the same data set and specification and interpret the differences. In addition, we present a simple ordinary least squares estimate since if there is no censoring (no misspecification error), the ordinary least squares will be the unbiased estimator. Table 3 contains the results for Benchmark regression I.
As we can see from the table, the column titled Heckman's procedure (two-sided tobit type II.) denotes the replicated regression of Choi (1999) . Restating his findings in the second step of the estimation procedure, all coefficients except for y . The results for Benchmark regression II. offer similar picture, as presented in Table 4 . .03 * * * Notes: see Table 3 .
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The benchmark regression II. includes two additional explanatory variables, i.e., the money gap m t and the measure of the misalignment of the discount rate and the market rate, s t .
Heckman's procedure delivers coefficients that all have the correct sign except for y t−1 and all variables appear significant, except for ∆i t−1 . In the case of the estimates derived through the combined ordered probit and censored regression, all coefficients have a correct sign and all coefficients are statistically significant, except for y t−1 . In addition, the point estimates are statistically different in all three variables: ∆π t , m t , and s t , which again points at the biasedness of parameter estimates in the two-sided tobit type II., due to ignoring the non-zero censored observations.
In fact, the problem of misspecification can be seen by comparing the parameters of the OLS with those of the ordered probit and censored regression procedure. If there is minimal censoring (nearly fully specified model), the parameter estimates from OLS approaches those from the ordered probit and censored regression procedure. This indicates that the model is correctly specified and there is negligible misspecification error. A test based on comparing parameter estimates can be easily devised, for instance, on the platform of the Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) . One can construct the Hausman m-statistics and test the following standard hypothesis. Under the H0: both the OLS and ordered probit and censored regression estimates are consistent and asymptotically efficient, while under H1: only the estimates from the ordered probit and censored regression procedure are consistent. 8 In both benchmark regressions, the Hausman test suggests misspecification in OLS estimates: χ 2 6 (31.42) = 0.00 and χ 2 7 (183.35) = 0.00, respectively. 9
A simpler test can be applied as well. Since the past dependent variable plays a prominent role in revealing policy rate inertia and at the same time serves as an instrument for omitted variables, one can test just the estimate of the coefficient α 1 ,i.e. b α 1 by OLS against the 8 The m-statistics reads: Table 3 and 4).
Policy inertia on quarterly frequency
Under the assumption of rational expectations of the financial market participants, the future policy rate changes of the monetary authority should be more predictable in the more distant future, the more the policy maker applies policy rate smoothing. Rudebusch 
Term structure evidence on policy inertia
In this section we display evidence that failure of the rational financial market participants to predict policy rate changes in the distant future might not be a clear proof of non-inertial behavior of the monetary institution. We put forward the observation of low forecastable variability of future policy rates by the monetary authority itself, by using an endogenous policy rate trajectory for predicting distant future policy rate changes. We assert that if the central bank itself can not predict future policy rates, despite very high degree of smoothing in the endogenous policy rate trajectory, how we could expect the market, even though rational, to do so. On the contrary, we believe that market rationality should be judged against the endogenous policy rate trajectory verbally communicated to the market by the central bank and not against the actual outcome of the policy rate at distant horizons.
Marginal regressions
We start with evaluating the forecastable variance of the future changes in policy rate by the market. We take the term structure of the forward rate agreements and test the predictability of the policy rate changes in a variety of forecast horizons. The following relation was tested using quarterly data covering the unconditional inflation targeting in the Czech Republic from October 2003 throughout January 2006:
The j stands for quarters and runs from one to four. The three month (interbank) interest rate from forward rate agreements set at time t for the period starting in j quarters is denoted as i F RA t,t+j . The inter-bank spot rate is denoted by i t , α j represents the average term premium for the respective period t + j and β j is the coefficient representing the relation between the realized and expected change in the rate.The error term ε t is i.i.d.
We opted for estimating the slope of the yield curve at every particular horizon rather than tangency to it, since in this specification we can minimize the influence of time varying term premia embedded in the forward contracts. In all regressions, there is only one average term premium, which is captured by α j . Such a specification is thus advantageous for the purpose of sensing the predictability of the future interest rates.
In order to perform a complementary test for the central hypothesis that if the central bank smooths its policy rates, a large share of the variability of the policy rates at more distant horizons should also be forecastable, we collected data for endogenous trajectories of the policy rate at each quarterly inflation-forecast round and evaluated the forecastable variance in the realized policy rate changes. The endogenous trajectory is based on the policy rule with a smoothing coefficient of .75. The smoothing in the policy rule seems to be rather close to the maximum smoothing of .8 that is justified by reasonable calibration of theoretical models. Rudebusch (2002) provides an interval 0 − .8 for optimal smoothing, which is also consistent with the findings by Woodford (1999) or Levin et al.(1999) , for instance. Therefore, a small portion of the future policy rate variability explained by the endogenous policy rate trajectory would be contradictory evidence leading to rejection of the central hypothesis. Hence, we estimate the following equation for the central bank:
where i ET t,t+j represents the future policy rate from the endogenous policy rate trajectory (mapping three months interbank rate) set at time t for j quarters ahead.
And finally, we also tested whether the market expectations are rational with respect to the monetary institution, i.e., whether the market successfully anticipates the endogenous policy rate trajectory of the central bank. For this purpose, we estimate another similar equation:
Data and estimation results
Making use of the data from the internal documents of the governing council of the Czech National Bank about macroeconomic unconditional projections (containing the endogenous policy rate trajectory for j quarters ahead), which are being made public with a delay of six years, and data from the Bloomberg database about the forward rate agreements at corresponding frequency to match the quarterly projections, we estimated the relations (16) through (18) .
The first result that follows from the regression (16) , as displayed in Table 5 , is that the interest rate at distant horizons is rather unpredictable by the market. In particular, we found a relatively large portion of the explained variability of the future realized policy rate development only at horizons up to two quarters. An exclusively high portion of explained variability can be recorded in the first quarter and somewhat lower in the second; however, as we move towards more distant quarters the share of explained variability drops literally to zero. Also, the slope coefficient is declining from unity rather rapidly, considering its insignificance already in the third quarter. 2H) are as follows: eq B1 and B2: 9, 9, 8, 7, 18, 15; eq B3: 9, 9, 9, 9, 18, 18 . The stars denote significance as follows: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
In order to control for the relatively small sample, we split the sample into two and estimated separately the predictability in the first half of the year ahead and in the second half and hereby confirmed our findings from quarter-by-quarter regressions; see bottom of Table 5 .
The second result follows from the estimation of regression (17) , presented in Table 5 . It stipulates that the endogenous policy rate trajectory is not predicting the variability of the future policy rate any better than the market. The proportion of explained variability to total variability in the policy rate plummets to zero relatively quickly, similarly to the case of financial market forecasts. The slope coefficient diverges from unity relatively quickly as well.
This finding unveils that the central bank changes the trajectory relatively often, due to various shocks in the determinants and even a high smoothing term is not sufficient to keep the distant future predictable. On the contrary, it might be well the case that high smoothing induces high predictability at shorter horizons, due to the fact that it, in some sense, freezes the rates on their past values but does not provide a sufficient anchor for distant horizons. Even more specifically, in many standard monetary models, where shocks are persistent, see CNB (2003), time also possibly plays a role. The less the central bank responds with rates to a shock now, the more it has to respond in the future in order to reach the target of price stability. This would paradoxically even increase the variability in the projected future rates and consequently would make future rates at the distant horizons be less predictable.
The results for the final equation (see Table 5 ) show that the predictability of the endogenous trajectory by the market is very high along the entire considered horizon of the monetary policy. This suggests relatively effective communication of the governing council in directing the market regarding the endogenous trajectory, considering that the implicit policy trajectory is not directly shared by the central bank with the market.
The portion of explained variability reaches 65−75 percent. In addition, the slope is rather close to unity and statistically significant, much along the horizons. This result shows that the market is rational with respect to the monetary authority that sets the policy rates.
However, the assumption that a rational market predicts the future changes in policy rate with no systematic bias turns out rather inappropriate for this type of process. Rather, the rationality should be measured against the monetary policy maker, i.e., the endogenous policy rate trajectory, where we also find it. This further implies that the hypothesis that poor performance of the market in predicting variability in the future policy rate is a sign of low smoothing in the policy rate is not supported as we find it, even though we know for certain that the endogenous policy rate trajectory contains a very high smoothing coefficient of .75.
Thus our empirical verification lends support to the findings by Soederlind et al. (2004) , who showed that monetary policy shocks are large and cause low predictability of future policy rates.
The evidence on overstated policy inertia
Even though the term structure is not likely to provide us with sufficient evidence on misspecification of empirical policy rules (wrong inclusion of past dependent variable, or at least overstated size of empirically estimated policy rate inertia), the robust estimator in the preceding sections (section 2 and 3) applied to monthly data (chapter 4 and 5) has
shown that there is indeed a misspecification issue in monthly data that is responsible for overstating the true policy rate inertia in least squares estimates. It might be useful to analyze whether the misspecification issue appears significant on the quarterly frequency as well, since the operational frequency is usually quarterly, even though the policy rate decisions take usually place monthly.
First, we have estimated the policy rule for the Czech National Bank, equation (13) with OLS on quarterly frequency and compared with the converted monthly estimates (section 4) into quarterly frequency. 10 The results for policy inertia estimate are displayed in Table   6 . .75 10 The conversion of estimates of inertia on monthly frequency into quarterly frequency is based on the following equivalence: ρ 3 m = ρ q , where ρ m and ρ q is the inertia estimate on monthly and quarterly frequency, respectively.
Notes: For a), b) and e), see notes to Table 2 . Monthly m0 corresponds to the cube root of the quarterly m 0 . Stars denote significance as follows: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% As it appears in the table, the OLS quarterly estimate, as well as the converted monthly OLS estimates, unveil the misspecification issue by overstating the policy rate inertia by The evidence from the Czech Republic suggests that the misspecification issue is present on both monthly as well as quarterly frequency. This might be connected to the fact that the Czech Republic is a small open economy, where some other factors can be assigned temporary importance, such as the exchange rate development. Such omitted variables might exhibit persistence and therefore do not average out by the construction of quarterly data from monthly data. Therefore, these variables might cause misspecification of the policy rule even on the quarterly frequency. Now, let us consider the situation in a large and relatively closed economy, the U.S. economy. We have sorted the evidence on inertia estimates in various time samples and methods used for estimation of the FED's policy rule in a core framework specification.
We focus, in particular, on the systematic dependence of the size of estimated inertia on the method used. We suppose that the policy inertia will be lower for estimators such as GMM, IV, 2SLS or the two-stage procedure of ordered probit and censored regression, compared to the OLS, since these estimators either use instruments B t so that B 0 t (Z 0 t β 0 ) = 0, or account for specification error directly, as the two-stage procedure.
We make use of 37 point estimates by Amato and Laubach (1999) It follows from the results that the bias in smoothing coefficient is significantly affected by the estimation method used. Using OLS for policy rule estimation biases upwards the policy rate inertia by .08 on quarterly frequency. The data sample turned out to be also a systematic factor for policy inertia. Namely, regression on more recent samples show typically higher inertia, ceteris paribus. In fact, we found that Volcker and Greenspan chairmanships were characterized by higher inertia by .04 than the average inertia. The alternative definitions of objectives did not prove to significantly influence the estimates of inertia in the literature.
Based on the results from the meta analysis, we draw the conclusion that the specification error is likely present at the quarterly frequency as well as at monthly frequency, even in a large, relatively closed economy such as the U.S. The size of overstatement of inertia is, however, of similar size (slightly lower) to the one found in the monthly regressions, converted into quarterly frequency, i.e., .14 (see section 4 and footnote 10).
Conclusion
In this paper, we contribute to the debate on policy rate inertia by pointing at the specification error of simple, operational policy rules of Taylor type. We develop an estimation procedure that is robust to marginal misspecification and provide an empirical application. We consider two extremes, a small open economy (the Czech Republic) and a large rather closed economy (the U.S.). We find robust evidence on specification error in the most commonly estimated specification of Taylor type policy rule in both countries. The misspecification biases coefficients in ordinary least squares regression and hence biases the inertia estimate upwards. In the analysis of the effect of data frequency, we find the bias being slightly smaller at quarterly frequency compared to monthly.
Placing our evidence on overstated monetary policy inertia by least squares into the context of practical policy making, we open a discussion on the consequences of least squares learning by a central bank. The learning based on least squares might cause policy to become increasingly inert over time. Ignoring the policy rule specification error, a central bank would believe that least squares describe their past actions and would recalibrate its models following the positivistic approach advocated by Taylor (1993) . However, since least squares estimates are systematically biasing the inertia upwards, the future policy would become excessively inert.
